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ABSTRACT 
 
SCOTT D. DYRENG: The Cost of Private Debt Covenant Violation 
(Under the direction of Edward L. Maydew)  
 
This study quantifies costs that firms are willing to incur to avoid violation of private 
debt covenants.  The results indicate that as firms approach covenant violation they 
engage in income-increasing earnings management, which increases their tax liability. By 
estimating the extent of income-increasing activities and the additional tax costs incurred, 
this study arrives at a lower-bound estimate of the cost of violating private debt 
covenants.  The mean (median) firm with relatively tight debt covenants increases its 
current tax liability by an amount equivalent to increasing the cost of debt financing by 
between 12.92 (10.72) and 22.72 (12.81) basis points (where firms with relatively loose 
debt covenants serve as the baseline). The magnitude of this estimate indicates that the 
expected costs of covenant violation are meaningful. Combined with recent evidence that 
private debt covenant violations occur frequently (Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Roberts and 
Sufi, 2007a), this implies debt covenants and expected violations are economically 
important. 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
 I am thankful for the dedicated support of my wife, Chelsea.  Without her 
encouragement, this project would have been impossible.  I appreciate the helpful 
comments of my dissertation committee: Ed Maydew (Chair), Robert Bushman, John 
Graham, Wayne Landsman, and Doug Shackelford.  I also appreciate comments from 
Ryan Ball, Kevin Markle, Ed Owens, Jana Raedy, Derrald Stice, Jake Thornock, Chris 
Williams. 
  
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES .....................................................................................................................v 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. vi 
 
THE COST OF PRIVATE DEBT COVENANT VIOLATION ...............................................1 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1 
 
Background and hypothesis development .................................................................................4 
 
Sample selection and descriptive statistics ..............................................................................10 
 
Empirical design ......................................................................................................................14 
 
Results ......................................................................................................................................23 
 
Conclusion and possible future research..................................................................................34 
 
References ................................................................................................................................50 
  
v 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 
 
1. Sample selection .......................................................................................................37 
 
2. Description of loan data from Dealscan....................................................................38 
 
3. Frequency of various financial covenants.................................................................39 
 
4. Estimation of the rate of conformity between  taxable 
income and book income ..........................................................................................40 
 
5. Descriptive statistics of variables used in tests of the 
relation between incremental tax expense and 
financial reporting pressure.......................................................................................42 
 
6. Test of incremental tax expense and financial 
reporting pressure from debt covenants ....................................................................44 
 
7. Piecewise non-linear test of incremental tax expense 
and financial reporting pressure from debt covenants ..............................................45 
 
8. Calculation of a lower bound on the cost of private 
debt covenant violation .............................................................................................46 
 
9. Additional computations of the cost of debt covenant 
violation and comparison of the cost of debt covenant 
violation to various benchmarks ...............................................................................47 
 
  
vi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 
 
1. Relation between estimated debt covenant slack 
(SLACK) and incremental tax expense .....................................................................54 
 
2. Evolution of incremental tax relative to quarter with 
the tightest decile of debt covenant slack .................................................................55 
 
  
  
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 The influence of debt on corporate decisions has been studied for decades in the 
accounting and finance literatures.  One consistent finding in this literature is that private 
debt covenants are violated frequently (Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Roberts and Sufi, 
2007a; Roberts and Sufi, 2007b).  Because of the frequency of private debt covenant 
violations, some have suggested the costs of violation are low (Dichev and Skinner, 
2002; Duke and Hunt, 1990).  Others have argued that the costs are high because firms 
are sometimes forced to make substantial concessions to lenders when renegotiating 
private credit agreements that contain financial covenants (Roberts and Sufi, 2007a; Nini, 
Roberts and Sufi, 2007). Surprisingly, little research exists that quantifies the costs of 
private debt covenant violation.  In this paper, I begin to fill this gap in the literature by 
estimating a lower-bound on the cost of debt covenant violation in private credit 
agreements. 
 I draw on two established lines of research in developing lower-bound estimates 
of the cost of private debt covenant violation.  One branch of research examines financial 
accounting incentives arising from debt covenants (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; 
Beatty and Weber, 2003; Beatty, Ramesh, and Weber, 2002; Defond and Jiambalvo, 
1994; Sweeney, 1994).  Another branch of research examines the decisions firms make 
when trading off the opposing incentives created by financial accounting and taxes (e.g., 
Hunt, Moyer, and Shevlin, 1996; Dhaliwal, Frankel, and Trezevant, 1994; Johnson and 
Dhaliwal, 1988).  I use techniques and insights from these literatures to test whether firms 
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that have covenants in their private credit agreements incur incremental tax costs in the 
process of managing earnings to avoid debt covenant violation. 
 Incremental tax costs may arise if the expected costs of covenant violation are 
greater than the expected costs associated with managing financial results to avoid 
covenant violation.  Borrowing firms have incentives to report performance that falls 
above covenant thresholds (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Dichev & Skinner, 2002; Nini 
et al., 2007).  As covenant slack tightens, these firms face greater pressure to make 
accounting choices that have an immediate favorable impact on reported performance.  
Because taxable income is positively correlated with accounting income, increases in 
accounting income can cause increases in tax expense.  Thus, firms may be forced to 
trade the benefits of avoiding covenant violations against the costs of increasing taxable 
income. 
 On the other hand, firms may be able to increase reported earnings using 
techniques that do not increase taxes.  For example, Baderstcher et al. (2007) find that 
firms are sometimes able to increase accounting income without increasing taxable 
income. That is, firms may use accounting methods or transactions that have a low rate of 
book-tax conformity, where book-tax conformity refers to the correspondence between 
accounting income and taxable income.  In addition, variation in marginal tax rates across 
firms may mitigate the actual tax expense incurred on increases in accounting income, 
even if the accounting income must be recognized as taxable income.  For example, a 
firm with substantial net operating loss carryforwards may be able to increase accounting 
earnings in a way that conforms to taxable income without actually increasing taxes in 
the current period.  
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The primary purpose of this paper is to estimate the average firm’s incremental 
tax cost resulting from actions taken to relieve debt covenant pressure.  Taking into 
consideration the rate of book-tax conformity and the marginal tax rate, and controlling 
for a variety of factors that may influence the firm’s incremental tax burden, I find that 
firms with tighter debt covenants incur more current tax expense than they would if they 
had more debt covenant slack or if they did not have debt covenants.  Estimates of 
incremental tax costs suggest that the mean (median) firm with relatively tight debt 
covenants increased its tax liability by an amount equivalent to increasing the cost of debt 
financing between 12.92 (10.72) and  22.72 (12.81) basis points, where firms with 
relatively loose debt covenants serve as the baseline. This result is evidence of a tax cost 
induced by debt covenants.  The bright line financial targets created by debt covenant 
thresholds encourage firms to make accounting choices that immediately increase 
accounting income, and consequently increase the firm’s tax burden.  All else equal, 
firms with more debt covenant pressure pay more tax than they would if they had no debt 
covenants.   
This finding creates a counterintuitive contrast with capital structure research in 
finance that documents tax benefits of debt.  That is, while debt may provide the firm 
with a tax benefit due to the deductibility of interest (Modigliani and Miller, 1963), the 
tax benefit is in part offset by additional tax costs the firm bears as a result of debt 
covenant pressure. 
This study contributes to the literature examining the costs and benefits of debt 
covenants.   For example, debt covenants have been shown to reduce the cost of 
borrowing (Bradley and Roberts, 2004), to increase borrowing capacity (Boot, 2000; 
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Petersen and Rajan, 1994), and to provide incentives for lenders to monitor the firm 
(Asquith, Beatty and Weber, 2005; Booth, 1992; Rajan and Winton, 1995).  Naturally, 
these benefits come at a cost.  I show that debt covenants lead firms to make accounting 
decisions that have real economic consequences in terms of incremental tax expense.  
Thus, increased tax expense from greater financial reporting pressure is one cost firms 
should consider when negotiating debt contracts.  Moreover, these findings may also 
partially explain why firms are underlevered.  Graham (2000) finds that the typical firm 
could double tax benefits by issuing debt until marginal tax benefits begin to decline.  
However, his analysis does not account for the possibility that the incentives to engage in 
income-increasing earnings management may change when levels of debt change, 
leading to increased tax costs.  
 This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 gives background information and 
develops the hypothesis.  Section 3 describes the sample selection.  Section 4 outlines the 
empirical design.  Section 5 presents the empirical results.  Section 6 provides concluding 
remarks. 
2.  Background and Hypothesis Development 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether firms incur additional tax costs 
because of financial reporting pressures created by debt covenants, and to quantify such 
costs in terms of relevant benchmarks.  To develop my hypothesis, I draw on techniques 
and insights from two established streams of literature. First, I draw on prior research that 
tests the relation between debt covenants and accounting outcomes.  Second, I draw on 
prior research that examines the relation between financial reporting costs and book-tax 
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conformity.    Combining the intuition from these two literatures, I develop and formally 
state my hypothesis.   
2.1  Debt covenants and accounting outcomes  
Debt covenants are one mechanism used by lenders to monitor the economic 
performance of borrowers (Asquith, Beatty, and Weber, 2005; Booth, 1992; Rajan and 
Winton, 1995; Smith and Warner, 1979).  In exchange for the right to set performance 
benchmarks, lenders grant more favorable loan terms and/or more credit to borrowers.  
For example, Bradley and Roberts (2004) find a negative relation between financial 
covenants and loan price.  Specifically, they find that increasing the likelihood that a firm 
has financial covenants by 50% decreases the expected cost of the loan by 1%.  Studies 
by Boot (2000), and Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that financial covenants are 
correlated with increased borrowing capacity. 
 Lenders evaluate financial reports each quarter to ensure the borrower’s reported 
performance falls within the covenant threshold.  When debt covenants are violated, 
lenders typically have the right to demand immediate repayment of the loan’s outstanding 
balance (Nini et al., 2007).  However, lenders rarely call the loan’s outstanding balance 
due.  Instead, lenders usually renegotiate covenant thresholds and loan terms with the 
borrower.  These negotiations often result in costly concessions from the borrower 
(Beneish and Press, 1993; Nini et al, 2007).  For example, lenders may restrict future 
capital expenditures (Roberts and Sufi, 2007a), limit merger and acquisition activity, or 
require changes in senior management (Baird and Rasmussen, 2006).  In addition, lenders 
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may restrict unused lines of credit, impose fines and fees, increase interest rates, or 
require additional collateral (Nini et al., 2007; Smith and Warner, 1978). 
Just how costly covenant violation is to the firm is an unanswered empirical 
question.  Some have argued that the costs of violating private debt covenants are 
relatively low.  These arguments are based on the frequency of observed debt covenant 
violations in private credit agreements.  For example, Dichev and Skinner (2002) find 
that 30% of firms in their sample report financial results outside the bounds of the 
covenant threshold.  They argue that if so many firms violate covenants, the costs of 
renegotiating the covenants or obtaining waivers from the lender must be relatively low.  
Consistent with this argument, Duke and Hunt (1990) suggest that obtaining a waiver of 
the debt covenant violation may be “as simple as making a phone call to the bank.” 
Nini et al. (2007) also document a high frequency of debt covenant violation, 
providing evidence that 25% of all public firms reported at least one covenant violation 
between 1996 and 2005.
1
  However, they document a variety of penalties imposed on 
violating firms in exchange for covenant waivers.  They suggest that these penalties, 
which include reduced borrowing capacity, increased interest costs, capital expenditure 
restrictions, and fees and penalties, are costly.  Although Nini et al. (2007) document the 
frequency of various outcomes of debt covenant violation, they do not provide estimates 
of the costs associated with these outcomes.  Thus, while there is some evidence that debt 
                                                 
1
 This figure likely understates the actual incidence of debt covenant violation because firms are not 
required to report debt covenant violations unless they are material and are unresolved when financial 
statements are issued. 
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covenant violation has associated costs, the magnitude of these costs remains an 
empirical question that has received sparse large sample testing.
2
   
If covenant violation is indeed costly, firms will have incentives to avoid 
reporting financial results outside the covenant threshold.  If incentives are strong 
enough, firms may use the latitude inherent in financial accounting rules to achieve the 
desired reported outcome (e.g., Press and Weintrop, 1990; Healy and Palepu, 1990).  The 
debt covenant hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) predicts that firms will choose 
accounting methods that decrease the likelihood of debt covenant violation.  For example, 
Beatty and Weber (2003) test whether firms with debt covenants are more likely to make 
income-increasing voluntary accounting changes than firms without debt covenants.
3
  
They find that firms with debt covenants are indeed more likely to adopt income-
increasing accounting policies than their non-covenant counterparts. 
A similar line of research asks whether financial reporting pressure from debt 
covenants increases earnings management (without explicitly causing firms to change 
accounting methods).  For example, Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeney (1994) 
identify ex-post firms that have violated debt covenants.  They then test whether 
discretionary accruals increase as firms approach technical default.  Consistent with their 
                                                 
2
 Beneish and Press (1995) examine the market reaction to public disclosure of debt covenant violation.   
Nevertheless, their study is limited to a small sample of firms that actually reported covenant violations, so 
it is likely restricted to severe cases of debt covenant violation. 
3
 Beatty and Weber (2003) also examine performance pricing provisions. 
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hypotheses, both studies find that discretionary accruals increase as firms approach 
technical default.
4
   
Dichev and Skinner (2002) study a large sample of firms with privately held loan 
contracts containing debt covenants.  They test whether realizations of financial ratios 
restricted by financial covenants appear to be random, or whether they appear to be 
opportunistically reported. They conclude that the distribution of financial ratios does not 
appear to be random.  Their results suggest that firms make accounting or investment 
choices that help them avoid covenant violation. 
While several studies have examined the influence of debt covenants on earnings 
management, none has explicitly considered associated costs of earnings management in 
the context of debt covenants.  These costs are important to consider because firms will 
only be tempted to manage earnings if the cost of managing earnings is less than the cost 
of violating debt covenants.  Managing earnings may have a variety of costly 
consequences, including sacrificing real economic value for accounting earnings 
(Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Wang and D’Souza, 2006), 
increasing regulatory scrutiny (Dechow et al., 1996; Liu and Ryan, 2006), increasing the 
likelihood of accounting restatements (Palmrose et al., 2004), and increasing the 
likelihood of shareholder litigation (Bonner et al., 1998; Skinner, 1997).  In addition, if 
taxable income is increasing in accounting earnings, firms may incur tax costs when 
managing earnings.   
                                                 
4
 Gramlich, McAnally, and Thomas (2000), and Gramlich, Mayew, and McAnally (2006) show that firms 
also use discretion to manage balance sheet accounts to improve financial ratios related to debt covenants. 
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The next sections more fully develop the possibility of an association between 
earnings management and tax expense.  I focus on the association between earnings 
management and tax expense because tax expense is an observable cost.  Calculating the 
amount of incremental tax expense firms are willing to incur to avoid crossing debt 
covenant thresholds will provide a lower-bound estimate of the cost of debt covenant 
violation.  That is, while increased tax expense in just one possible cost of managing 
earnings, and managing earnings is just one costly behavior firms may engage in to avoid 
debt covenant violation, firms are not expected to manage earnings to a point where the 
increased tax expense is greater than the cost of violating a debt covenant.  Thus, my 
calculations should be, on average, smaller than the actual cost of debt covenant 
violation. 
2.2 Financial reporting costs and book-tax trade-offs 
The financial reporting costs created by debt covenants may drive firms to make 
income-increasing accounting or investing choices.  While firms prefer to increase 
accounting income without increasing taxable income (Badertscher et al, 2006; 
Badertscher et al, 2007), tax rules often prevent the simultaneous satisfaction of both 
financial reporting incentives and tax incentives. In these situations firms will be forced 
to trade the benefits of satisfying one incentive against the costs of failing to satisfy the 
other incentive.   
Examples of firms incurring real economic tax costs to achieve a desired financial 
reporting treatment have been documented by Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2004), 
Robinson (2007), Maydew, Schipper, and Vincent (1999), Engel, Erickson, and Maydew 
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(1999), and others.
5
  Using a sample of firms accused of accounting fraud by the SEC, 
Erickson et al. (2004) show that firms are willing to pay $0.11 to the IRS in tax for every 
$1.00 of fraudulent earnings.  Robinson (2007) shows that firms are willing to pay more 
for tax credits that increase pre-tax income than similar credits that increase after-tax 
income, even though the net income effect is equal for both.  Maydew et al. (1999) find 
that managers are willing to incur avoidable tax costs to gain earnings and cash flow 
benefits in a setting examining spin-offs and divestitures, while Engel et al. (1999) show 
that firms are willing to sacrifice real economic gains to improve debt-to-assets ratios.   
In addition, Cloyd, Pratt, and Stock (1996) and Mills and Newberry (2001) study 
whether managers are more willing to incur tax costs as financial reporting pressure 
increases.  Both studies compare private firms to public firms under the assumption that 
financial reporting pressure is greater for public firms.  The results from both studies are 
consistent with private firms being more willing than public firms to take aggressive tax 
positions even if the tax position will result in lower reported accounting income. 
These studies suggest that as taxes and financial reporting interact, financial 
reporting pressure changes.  When financial reporting pressure is high, firms will be 
unwilling to reduce accounting income even if it could result in tax savings.  On the other 
hand, firms will be willing to increase accounting income even if it could result in tax 
costs.  That is, when financial reporting pressure is high, firms are more likely to forgo 
tax-saving transactions or accounting choices in favor of income-increasing transactions 
or accounting choices.  If the cost of debt covenant violation exceeds the cost of greater 
                                                 
5
 See Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for a review of research that examines the trade-off between financial 
reporting incentives and tax incentives. 
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taxes from increasing reported income, debt covenants may increase the tax burden firms 
bear, relative to what they would bear absent debt covenants.  This leads to my 
hypothesis, stated in alternative form:  
HA:  There is a positive relation between financial reporting pressure induced by 
debt covenants and the firm’s incremental tax burden. 
That is, I hypothesize that managing earnings to avoid debt covenant thresholds induces 
firms to incur greater tax costs than they would if they did not have debt covenants. 
3.  Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
The sample selection begins with debt covenant data from the Dealscan database 
provided by Loan Pricing Corporation, and financial statement data from Compustat, 
provided by Standard & Poor’s.  The Dealscan database consists of private credit 
agreements obtained from SEC filings and sources that Loan Pricing Corporation has 
developed directly with lenders.  The database contains information on interest rates, 
financial covenants, performance pricing grids, lenders, and loan maturities for both 
individual loans and groups of loans called packages or deals. 
   Table 1 describes the sample selection.  Firms are selected from the Compustat 
quarterly files covering the sample period 1994 to 2006.  Each firm-quarter is required to 
have non-missing values of the following variables: 
1) Working capital accruals (dWC) calculated as (∆data40-∆data36)-(∆data49-
∆data47- ∆data45).   Missing values of taxes payable (data47) are set to zero;6 
2) Gross property, plant and equipment (GPPE) (data118); 
                                                 
6
 I remove taxes payable from working capital accruals to ensure that the incremental tax effect I capture is 
indeed related to the management of accruals, and not simply a spurious change in the firm’s tax liability. 
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3) Net property, plant and equipment (PPE) (data42); 
4) Change in sales less the change in receivables (∆data2-∆data37); 
5) Pre-tax income (PTBI) (data23);   
6) Current and lagged total assets (data44); 
7) Market to book ratio (MB)((data14*data61)/data60). 
Firms are also required to have current tax expense (data63+data64) from the Compustat 
annual files.
7
   
These data requirements result in the selection of 5,082 firms corresponding to 
96,499 firm-quarters.  I match these firms to the Dealscan data using name and ticker 
symbol.  Of the 5,082 Compustat firms, 1,775 have at least one deal recorded in Dealscan 
with at least one financial statement-based covenant, reducing the sample to 51,795 firm-
quarters.  Of the 51,795 firm-quarters , 35,596 correspond to quarters when a loan is 
outstanding according to the deal effective dates reported in Dealscan.  Finally, for most 
of my tests I require an estimate of debt covenant slack (SLACK).   Data requirements to 
compute SLACK (described later) reduce the sample to 1,186 firms, corresponding to 
16,651 firm-quarters.  Many firms engaged in multiple deals.
8
  Thus, the 1,775 (1,186) 
firms are represented by 4,038 (2,096) deals in Dealscan.  
 Table 2 presents some of the basic characteristics of the debt contracts in my 
sample.  The mean firm in my sample has 2.27 private debt deals on Dealscan.    The 
mean (median) deal is $342.30 ($115) million.  An alternative measure is to scale the 
                                                 
7
 I use the Compustat annual files for this data because current tax expense is not available in the quarterly 
files. If data63 or data64 is missing , I use (data16-data50) as a measure of current tax expense. 
8
 The most primitive unit of observation in Dealscan is a “facility” which is an individual loan.  I refer to 
groups of loans initiated at the same time and packaged together with a common set of covenants as 
“deals”. 
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deal size by total assets.  The mean deal is 31% of total assets, with the median deal 24% 
of total assets.  It should be noted that many of the deals captured in Dealscan are lines of 
credit that are not completely drawn down.  Thus, the actual mean (median) liability is 
likely to be less than the 31% (24%) of assets reported in Table 2. 
On average, deals mature in 16 quarters.  However, deal terms may be 
renegotiated upon covenant violation.  Dichev and Skinner (2002) report that debt 
covenants do not appear to be binding after the first violation.  Therefore, I calculate an 
alternative length of maturity as an estimate of the length of time the covenant recorded 
in Dealscan is binding.  Using estimates of covenant violation (described below), I 
estimate that the average deal is no longer effective as recorded in Dealscan after eight 
quarters. The average spread over LIBOR is 172 basis points, with the median spread 
over LIBOR coming in at 150 basis points.
9
 
 Among firms with at least one financial covenant, 62% of deals have at least one 
financial statement-based performance pricing provision.  The average firm has 2.96 
financial covenants.  Table 3, shows the frequency and types of financial covenants.  The 
most common financial covenants are debt to earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) (45% of deals), fixed charge coverage (37% of 
deals), and interest coverage (33% of deals).  The least common financial covenants are 
cash interest coverage (1% of deals), senior leverage (less than 1%) and loan to value 
(less than 1%).   
  
                                                 
9
 Most deals in Dealscan show rate spreads over LIBOR, while a few report spreads over the prime rate.  
The distinction is not important in this study. 
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4.  Empirical Design 
As stated earlier, the objectives of this paper are to test whether firms incur tax 
costs incremental to what they would have incurred absent the financial reporting 
pressure from debt covenants, and to quantify the incremental costs.  Recall from the 
hypothesis developed above that I expect a positive relation between financial reporting 
pressure induced by debt covenants and incremental tax expense.  The hypothesized 
relation between incremental tax expense and debt covenants can be written as:  
,  (1) 
where ITAX is incremental tax expense (defined below).  The hypothesis predicts  to be 
positive. 
Estimation of Eq. (1) requires empirical proxies for incremental tax expense, 
financial reporting pressure from debt covenants, and control variables.  In section 4.1 I 
develop a proxy for incremental tax.  In section 4.2 I develop a proxy for debt covenant 
pressure.  In section 4.3 I identify control variables and explain how they are empirically 
measured. 
4.1  Measuring incremental tax expense 
I estimate the incremental tax cost firms bear in three steps.  First, I develop a 
measure of discretionary income using the method developed in Jones (1991).
10
  Second, 
I estimate the rate at which discretionary income maps into taxable income.  Third, I use 
the results from the first two steps and a proxy for the firm’s marginal tax rate to estimate 
the taxes firms pay on discretionary income.  I call this variable ITAX for incremental tax 
expense. 
                                                 
10
 By using the Jones (1991) model in this setting to compute discretionary income  I assume that firms 
have no discretion in cash flows, that the predicted component of total accruals is likewise non-
discretionary, and the residual component of accruals is discretionary 
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4.1.1  Estimating discretionary income 
A large body of research tests whether firms report opportunistic financial 
outcomes.  Most of this work requires researchers to estimate discretionary income.  
Studies by Jones (1991), Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and Kothari, Leone, and 
Wasley (2005) are prominent in this literature.  Jones (1991) estimates discretionary 
income by regressing total accruals on the firm’s property, plant and equipment and the 
change in the firm’s sales.  The intuition underlying the Jones (1991) model is that these 
factors will capture the economic forces driving nondiscretionary accruals.  The residual 
from this regression is then considered to be the portion of income that is not driven by 
economic fundamentals, but rather by managerial discretion in accounting choices or 
accrual estimation.  Dechow et al. (1995) test the empirical validity of the Jones (1991) 
measure of discretionary accruals.  They find that a modified model produces more 
powerful results than the original model, but argue that neither model is particularly 
powerful.  Kothari et al. (2005) suggest that adjusting discretionary accrual measures for 
economic performance increases its empirical validity. 
I use a variant of the model in Jones (1991) to estimate discretionary income.  
Following prior research (Bartov, Gul, and Tsui, 2000; Balsam, Bartov, and Marquardt, 
2002; Louis and Robinson, 2005; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998), I estimate the 
regression shown below for each two-digit SIC code and year: 
. (2) 
where  is a separate intercept for each fiscal quarter, dWC is working capital 
accruals, GPPE is gross property, plant and equipment, dSALES is the change in sales 
less the change in accounts receivable, and PTBI is pre-tax book income.  All variables 
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(including the four separate intercepts) are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
period.  I use working capital accruals instead of total accruals as the dependent variable 
because nearly all income statement-based financial covenants are written on earnings 
before depreciation.  In terms of avoiding the costs associated with debt covenant 
violation, firms gain little, or perhaps nothing at all, by managing earnings after 
depreciation.  Therefore, including depreciation or other long-term accruals in the 
dependent variable may add noise to the error term and diminish the validity of estimated 
discretionary income for purposes of this study. Second, I include pre-tax book income as 
a control for performance (Kothari et al., 2005).  The empirical estimate of the error term 
from this regression, , is used as a measure of discretionary income for each firm i at 
time t.  I call this measure DACC. 
4.1.2  Estimating the rate at which financial income maps into taxable income 
Taxes are not necessarily paid on all earnings recognized in the financial 
statements.  Establishing the relation between accounting income and taxable income is 
the next step in calculating a proxy for incremental tax expense.  For purposes of this 
study, the relation between pre-tax book income (PTBI) and taxable income ( ) is 
defined as: 
, (3) 
where  captures the rate at which current PTBI maps into .  Prior research suggests 
that the rate of conformity may differ systematically across firms with and without 
financial reporting pressure from debt covenants (Cloyd et al., 1996; Mills and Newberry, 
2001).  In the notation of Eq. (3) this can be written as:  
 , (4) 
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where COVFIRM is an indicator variable equal to one if the firms has debt covenants, 
zero otherwise. 
Substituting Eq. (4) into Eq. (3) yields the following: 
. (5) 
Taxable income ( ) is not observable in financial statement data and is therefore 
measured with error from publicly available disclosures (Hanlon, 2003).  This can be 
written as: 
, (6) 
where TI is the empirical proxy for true taxable income, , and e is measurement error. 
Substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (5) gives the following expression: 
, (7) 
where α0  captures the mean of the measurement error , and ε captures the random 
variation in . 
It is possible that the rate of conformity differs for non-discretionary income and 
discretionary accruals.  To allow for this possibility, I modify Eq. (7) as follows: 
,   (8) 
where  is non-discretionary income, DACC is discretionary accruals and 
COVFIRM is an indicator equal to one if the firm has a covenant outstanding during the 
year, zero otherwise. 
 The empirical estimation of Eq. (8) is implemented with annual data because 
information to calculate taxable income (TI) is not available quarterly.  I sum the four 
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quarters of discretionary accruals (DACC) estimated earlier to obtain an estimate of 
annual discretionary accruals. 
The estimated coefficient  captures the rate of conformity between 
discretionary income and taxable income for firms without debt covenants. Likewise the 
sum of the estimated coefficients, + , captures the rate of conformity between 
discretionary income and taxable income for firms with debt covenants. 
Eq. (8) has been developed without regard to a variety of firm-specific control 
variables that could be correlated with book-tax conformity.  This is because the goal of 
Eq. (8) is not to explain book-tax conformity.  Rather, the purpose of Eq. (8) is to develop 
an estimate of the rate of book-tax conformity for firms with and without debt covenants.  
Controlling for firm-specific factors that could influence the rate of book-tax conformity 
will be addressed in section 4.3 below.  
4.1.3  Calculating incremental tax. 
Having now estimated discretionary income for each firm, and having an estimate 
of book-tax conformity for discretionary income, I can estimate the primary variable of 
interest, incremental tax expense as 
, (9a) 
for firms without covenants, and  
 , (9b) 
for firms with covenants. The parameter  is the marginal tax rate from Graham (1996) 
for firm i.
11
 
4.2  Measuring reporting pressure from debt covenants. 
                                                 
11
 Marginal tax rates are available upon request from John Graham for academic research purposes.  If the 
firm’s marginal tax rate is missing from the file received from John Graham, I assume that its marginal tax 
rate is the top statutory tax rate (usually 35% during my sample period). 
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Measuring financial reporting pressure from debt covenants is the second 
empirical challenge I face.  Debt covenant slack is not reported in public filings with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.  However, recent research has begun to identify 
and evaluate loan covenants using data provided by Loan Pricing Corporation in the 
database Dealscan (e.g., Dichev and Skinner, 2002). 
My first measure of financial reporting pressure from debt covenants is covenant 
slack (SLACK).  I measure covenant slack using quarterly Compustat data for each firm 
with at least one of the following financial statement covenants:  current ratio, interest 
coverage, quick ratio, EBITDA, debt to EBITDA, debt to equity, debt to tangible net 
worth, leverage, tangible net worth, and net worth.  Firms that do not have one of these 
covenants are not given a value of SLACK, and are excluded from analyses that use 
SLACK. For each covenant I measure SLACK as the actual value of the covenant 
estimated using Compustat quarterly data less the covenant threshold from Dealscan, the 
difference scaled by the standard deviation of the actual value over the previous eight 
quarters.  Because measuring debt covenant slack is noisy (Dichev and Skinner, 2002), I 
rank these values into deciles for each covenant.  In spite of difficulties in estimating 
covenant slack, I expect that, on average, the slack variable will be correlated with the 
firm’s actual debt covenant slack.  Excessive noise in the empirical estimate of SLACK 
will bias against finding results. 
As a robustness check, I measure reporting pressure from debt covenants as an 
indicator variable that is equal to one of the firm has debt covenants and zero otherwise.  
This method allows for a much larger sample, but does not facilitate comparison of firms 
with tight covenants to firms with loose covenants. 
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4.3 Identifying and measuring control variables 
As noted earlier, incremental tax expense (ITAX) could be influenced by a variety 
of firm-specific factors.  These factors may influence ITAX via discretionary accruals 
estimates, or via the rate of book-tax conformity.  I therefore identify and control for 
several factors. 
First, I control for observations that have negative pre-tax accounting income.  
Estimating taxable income from financial statements can be problematic for loss firms 
because losses and gains are treated asymmetrically for tax purposes.  Although I attempt 
to control for this issue by subtracting the change in the firm’s net operating loss 
carryforward balance from grossed up current tax expense when calculating taxable 
income, this fix may not be perfect.  For example, Mills et al.  (2003) document 
reliability problems with the Compustat net operating loss variable.  Thus, I include a 
variable (NEG) that equals one if the firm has a pre-tax accounting loss, and zero 
otherwise. 
Second, I control for net operating loss carryforwards (NOL) by including an 
indicator variable that is equal to one if Compustat reports a net operating loss balance at 
the end of the year, zero otherwise.  I include this variable to control for the possibility 
that firms with NOL carryforwards can manage earnings without incurring incremental 
tax expense.  
Third, I control for capital intensity by including gross property, plant and 
equipment (PP&E).  I include this variable to help control for cross-sectional differences 
in business models that could change a firm’s ability or propensity to engage in earnings 
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management.  In addition, firms with greater capital intensity may have a different 
propensity to borrow funds and/or agree to debt covenants in private credit agreements. 
Fourth, I control for the ratio of intangible assets to total assets, INTANG.  Firms 
with intangible assets may be more capable of shifting income to low-tax jurisdictions 
than firms with tangible assets.  For example, a recent Wall Street Journal article 
highlighted a tax avoidance technique used by Merck to shift income from the patents 
related to the drug Zocor to a subsidiary in Bermuda, thereby avoiding taxes.
12
  In 
addition, firms with a high proportion of intangible assets may have a lower ability to 
obtain debt financing because they may have fewer tangible assets to pledge as collateral.   
 Fifth, I include an indicator variable for whether or not the firm reports foreign 
pre-tax income (FOPS).  Foreign operations may change book-tax conformity because 
the company is operating in a variety of different tax jurisdictions.  Multinational firms 
may have more opportunities to shift income to avoid taxes (Rego, 2003). 
 Sixth, I control for firm size (SIZE), measured as the natural log of total assets.  
Firm size may be important in explaining book-tax differences because it may act as a 
proxy for tax planning ability, the ability to shift income among various subsidiaries 
within the corporate structure, or financial sophistication.  However, the empirical 
findings on the relation between firm size and various tax characteristics have been 
mixed (Zimmerman, 1983; Rego, 2003).  Firm size has also been shown to correlate with 
discretionary accruals (Kothari et al. 2005; Kim et al., 2003).   
 Seventh, I control for the market to book ratio (MB), measured as the market 
value of equity to the book value of equity at the fiscal quarter end.  The market to book 
                                                 
12
 Drucker, Jesse. 2006. "Bermuda Triangle: How Merck Saved $1.5 Billion Paying Itself for Drug 
Patents." The Wall Street Journal:A1. 
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ratio may be associated with growth opportunities that could affect the firm’s propensity 
to borrow.  It could also reflect intangible assets that  may not be reflected on the firm’s 
balance sheet but are priced. 
 Eighth, I control for industry effects by including an indicator variable for each 
two-digit SIC code (INDUSTRY).  Book-tax differences may vary by industry because of 
different asset compositions across industries, and different accounting conventions 
common within a given industry.  Some tax rules and accounting conventions are 
industry-specific (Plesko, 2007).  Earnings management may also vary across industries. 
 Finally, I control for time effects by including an indicator variable for each 
quarter (TIME).  Book-tax conformity may vary over time as statutory differences 
between accounting income and taxable income change.   
 Including these variables as controls results in the following regression: 
. (10) 
where all variables are as previously defined.  Based on my hypothesis above, I expect a 
negative relation between SLACK and ITAX ( < 0).  That is, as debt covenant slack 
tightens (becomes smaller), incremental tax expense will increase. 
 The model in Eq. (10) forces the relation between incremental tax and debt 
covenant slack to be linear.  I relax this assumption by allowing SLACK to be piecewise 
non-linear as follows: 
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. (11) 
In this specification, firm-quarters falling in the loosest three groups of the 
SLACK distribution serve as the baseline group (captured by the intercept).  
TIGHTSLACK captures firm-quarters in the tightest three groups of the distribution, and 
MIDSLACK captures firm-quarters in the middle four groups of the distribution.  The 
hypothesis predicts that  will be positive, and that  will be positive, but less than . 
5.  Results 
In this section I first present descriptive statistics and results from the book-tax 
conformity model.  I then present results from the tests of my hypothesis.  Finally, I 
calibrate the economic magnitude of the results. 
5.1  Book-tax conformity models 
Descriptive statistics on variables used to estimate the rate of conformity between 
book and taxable income are presented in Table 4.  Recall that this portion of the analysis 
(Table 4 only) uses firm-years (as opposed to firm-quarters in the remainder of the 
analysis) because data limitations preclude the calculation of taxable income with 
quarterly periodicity. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for firm-years associated with 
firms that have a covenant outstanding.  Panel B shows descriptive statistics for firm-
years that do not have a debt covenant.  Panel C reports the estimation of the conformity 
regressions suggested by Eq. (7) and Eq. (8). 
Panels A and B suggest that firms with debt covenants are more profitable, have 
higher taxable income, and have higher discretionary accruals than firms without debt 
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covenants.  These facts suggest the need to allow the conformity coefficients estimated in 
Table 4, Panel C to vary depending on whether the firm has debt covenants. 
Table 4, Panel C presents the results of the book-tax conformity regressions 
suggested by Eq. (8) and Eq. (9).  The first model suggests that, on average, $0.83 per 
dollar of pre-tax accounting income is recognized as taxable income for firms without 
debt covenants, while $0.78 per dollar of pre-tax accounting income is recognized as 
taxable income for firm with debt covenants.  In Model 2, I allow the coefficient to vary 
for non-discretionary and discretionary income.  I find that the rate of conformity for 
discretionary accruals is not statistically different from non-discretionary accruals.  
Consistent with prior research (Cloyd et al 1996; Mills and Newberry, 2001), I find that 
firms with financial reporting pressure from debt covenants have lower book-tax 
conformity than firms without financial reporting pressure from debt covenants.  In fact, 
firms with debt covenants have about $0.07 cents less per dollar map into taxable income 
than their non-covenant counterparts.  However, the result does not hold for the 
discretionary portion of income.  Covenant firms appear to have slightly higher book-tax 
conformity for the discretionary portion of income, but this result is not statistically 
significant. 
These results are generally consistent with the incentives facing firms with 
covenants.  Firms with covenants will be less willing to engage in conforming 
transactions that reduce taxable income because they may also reduce book income, 
resulting in lower book-tax conformity.  On the other hand, covenant firms may be more 
willing to engage in income-increasing discretionary actions, in spite of the fact that they 
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may increase taxable income.  Empirically, there is no difference between the conformity 
of discretionary accruals for covenant firms and non-covenant firms. 
5.2  Incremental tax and financial reporting pressure 
Table 5, Panels A and B present descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
tests of my hypothesis.  Of primary interest is the incremental tax variable, ITAX.  Recall 
from section 4.3 that ITAX is calculated using discretionary income and book-tax 
conformity results.  Univariate statistics suggest that the mean ITAX is greater for firms 
with debt covenants (0.03% of beginning assets) than it is for firms without debt 
covenants (-0.02% of beginning assets). 
Table 5, Panel A also shows descriptive statistics for the estimate of debt 
covenant slack, SLACK.  SLACK is a discrete variable, ranging in value from zero to 
nine.  Firms with the tightest debt covenant slack (with the most financial reporting 
pressure) have low values of SLACK.  The mean (median) firm has a value of SLACK of 
3.98 (4.00).  While SLACK is based on decile rankings of each covenant’s slack 
compared to other values of slack for the same covenant, the mean of SLACK varies from 
the value of 4.50 that would be expected from a true decile ranking.  This happens 
because some firms have more than one covenant during a given quarter, and I use the 
tightest value of SLACK for a firm during each quarter, skewing the distribution slightly 
toward tighter covenants.  Thus, the 10 SLACK groups do not each contain exactly 10% 
of the sample 
Table 5 also presents descriptive statistics for the control variables used in the 
regressions.  Panel A reveals that 15% of firms with debt covenants have negative annual 
earnings.  This number jumps to about 35% for non-covenant firms in Panel B.  
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Consistent with earlier findings that covenant firms appear to be more profitable, Panel A 
reveals that covenant firms have lower net operating loss carryforwards than their non-
covenant counterparts in Panel B.  Not surprisingly, covenant firms also have more long-
term debt (27% of assets) than non-covenant firms (19% of total assets).  In fact, 
covenant firms appear to be different from non-covenant firms on just about every 
dimension reported.  Because of this, most of my empirical tests are estimated within the 
cross-section of firms with debt covenants. 
Table 6 reports the results of fitting the regression suggested by Eq. (10).  These 
results are a direct test of the main hypothesis.  Models 1-3 are estimated only using firms 
with debt covenants and values of SLACK. All coefficients (and standard errors) are 
multiplied by 100 to aid in presentation of the results.  Recall from the hypothesis section 
that I expect incremental tax expense to be increasing in debt covenant pressure.  Because 
debt covenant pressure is decreasing in SLACK, I expect to find that the coefficient on 
SLACK is negative.  Consistent with this prediction, the coefficient is negative and 
significant across all variations in the model.  In Model 1, I estimate Eq. (10) excluding 
controls.  In Model 2, I estimate Eq. (10) controlling for firm-specific factors, but 
excluding industry and time fixed effects.  Finally, in Model 3 I estimate Eq. (10) as it is 
specified, including both firm-specific controls and industry and time fixed effects. While 
the economic magnitude of the coefficient on SLACK is examined in detail in section 5.3 
below, the results suggest that tightening debt covenant slack by one decile increases the 
firm’s incremental tax expense per quarter by 0.02% of total assets, controlling for other 
factors that may influence the incremental tax measure.  Standard errors are clustered by 
firm and time (Petersen, 2007). 
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In Model 4 of Table 6 I estimate the model suggested by Eq. (10), except I 
include firms that do not have debt covenants, and substitute an indicator variable, 
COVFIRM, for SLACK.  The indicator variable COVFIRM is equal to one if the firm has 
debt covenants and zero otherwise.  I predict a positive coefficient on COVFIRM because 
firms with covenants are predicted to have more financial reporting pressure than firms 
without covenants.  I find results consistent with the prediction.  The coefficient suggests 
that incremental tax expense is 0.06% of assets per quarter higher for firms with 
covenants than for firms without covenants.  This magnitude would be equivalent to a 
three decile tightening of SLACK based on the results presented for Model 3. 
The analysis in Table 6, Models 1-3, based on Eq. (10), forces the relation 
between incremental tax and SLACK to be linear.  The model suggested by Eq. (11) 
relaxes this assumption by creating indicator variables for the tightest three SLACK 
groups, called TIGHTSLACK, and the middle four SLACK groups, called MIDSLACK.  
The loosest three SLACK groups are captured by the intercept. 
Table 7 presents the results from this modified specification.  Again, all 
coefficients are multiplied by 100 to facilitate presentation.  In Model 1 I estimate the 
regression without any control variables. Model 2 includes firm-specific control 
variables, while Model 3 includes the firm-specific controls, and industry and time fixed 
effects.  While the economic magnitude of these results will be explored in detail in 
section 5.3 below, an initial examination of the results suggests that firms with debt 
covenant slack in the tightest three groups (TIGHTSLACK) incur 0.08% of total assets 
more tax expense per quarter than firms with debt covenant slack in the loosest three 
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groups.  Firms in the middle four groups (MIDSLACK) of debt covenant slack are no 
different statistically than firms in the tightest three groups of debt covenant slack.
13
   
To graphically illustrate the relation between debt covenant slack and incremental 
tax expense, I further loosen the restrictions on the model suggested by Eq. (11) and 
allow each SLACK group to have its own coefficient.  A graphical illustration of this 
result is presented in Figure 1.  The figure plots incremental tax on the Y axis against 
SLACK on the X axis.  I find that the 1
st
, 2
nd
, and 4
th
 groups are statistically different from 
firms without debt covenants (represented by white markers in the figure).  The figure 
shows a generally downward-sloping trend.  Most of the incremental tax appears to be 
paid by firms in the tightest four groups of the SLACK distribution, while the loosest six 
groups are relatively flat. 
5.3  Economic magnitude of incremental tax expense 
I calculate the economic magnitude of the results in Table 8, and compare the 
results to various benchmarks in Table 9.  Because accruals management is akin to 
borrowing earnings from the future, any incremental tax paid is assumed to be the 
acceleration of tax expense, not the creation of new tax expense.  I assume that by 
accelerating tax each quarter for t quarters, the firm is foregoing the opportunity to make 
one lump sum payment in quarter t+1.  Thus, the cost to the firm is in the time value of 
money resulting from accelerated tax payments.  For example, suppose the effective life 
of the loan is eight quarters.  The firm could choose to pay $1.00 each quarter for eight 
quarters, or a lump sum of $8.00 in the ninth quarter.   In this example, and assuming a 
2.5% quarterly interest rate, the value lost because of tax payment acceleration would be 
                                                 
13
 In unreported results, I include all firms that do not have debt covenants.  I find that the firms in the 
tightest group are statistically different from firms without debt covenants.  I also find that firms in the 
middle and loose SLACK groups are statistically indistinguishable from firms without debt covenants. 
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$0.76.
14
  In other words, the firm would lose $0.76 over the life of the loan by paying 
$1.00 each quarter instead of $8.00 in the ninth quarter. 
Table 8 illustrates the computation of the incremental tax costs firms incur in 
terms of basis points.  In Line 1, I present the coefficient from Table 7, Model 3.  This 
coefficient suggests that firms in the tightest three SLACK groups pay on average 0.08% 
of assets in incremental tax each period.  Line 2 is a time value of money factor for each 
$1.00 accelerated each quarter, assuming a 2.5% quarterly interest rate, and the mean 
(median) effective loan maturity from Table 2.  Line 3 in Table 8 multiplies these two 
numbers to calculate the discounted tax cost over the life of the loan.  Over the life of the 
average loan in the tightest three SLACK groups, a firm would expect to increase tax 
costs by 0.06% of total assets because of the acceleration of tax payments.   
The economic significance of the tax cost is difficult to interpret without a 
reasonable benchmark.  A natural benchmark is interest expense.  In Line 4 of Table 8 I 
report the mean (median) interest expense (scaled by lagged total assets) for each firm-
quarter.  I assume that the mean (median) firm pays this amount of interest each quarter.  
Using a 2.5% quarterly discount rate, I calculate the present value of all interest payments 
over the life of the mean (median) loan.  The time value of money factor is presented in 
Line 5 for the mean (median) effective loan maturity.  Line 6 shows that over the life of 
the loan, the mean (median) firm would pay 3.73% (2.52%) of total assets in interest 
expense.  Dividing the discounted tax cost of the loan by the discounted interest cost of 
the loan suggests that tax costs are 1.70% (1.52%) of interest costs at the mean (median).  
Empirically, the mean (median) firm appears to pay an interest rate of 761 (706) basis 
                                                 
14
 The calculation is: $1.00 PVA(8,2.5%) - $1.00*t PV(9,2.5%). 
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points.
15
  Thus, the tax cost is equivalent in size to paying 12.92 (10.72) additional basis 
points on its debt at the mean (median).  This amount could be interpreted as a lower 
bound on the cost of covenant violation.  The average firm appears to be willing to 
sacrifice an amount equal to 12.92 basis points of interest on its loans to avoid violating 
debt covenants. 
In Table 9 I compare the results to several benchmarks.  The first row in Panel A 
presents the tax cost of violation calculated in Table 8.  In the next row, I compare the 
basis point calculation to the stated loan spread (usually the interest rate above LIBOR).  
I find that the mean (median) firm incurs tax costs equivalent to about 7.53% (7.14%) of 
its loan spread.   
In the third row of Table 9, Panel A, I calculate how much incremental tax the 
firm pays for every $100 of discretionary accruals.  For this calculation I divide the 
present value of the tax cost by the present value of all discretionary accruals over the life 
of the loan.  The numerator is obtained from Table 8, Line 3.  The denominator is 
obtained by estimating the following model: 
 
. (12) 
I use the coefficient on TIGHTSLACK as an estimate of the discretionary income 
of the average firm with tight slack.  Assuming the firm accelerates this amount of 
income in each quarter for the life of the loan, I calculate the present value of 
discretionary accruals.  I use this value for the denominator. 
                                                 
15
 I estimate the cost of debt by dividing the firm’s interest expense by its long term debt and debt in current 
liabilities. 
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I find that the average firm with SLACK in the tightest three groups pays $2.80 for 
every $100 of discretionary accruals.  This result is approximately one-fourth as large as 
the $11.00 in taxes paid per $100 of allegedly fraudulent earnings documented by 
Erickson et al. (2004).  However, the earnings management I document is likely to be 
much less severe than the alleged fraud studied by Erickson et al. (2004), so the lower tax 
cost is reasonable. 
In Panels B and C of Table 9, I calculate the lower bound on covenant violation 
using two alternative methods.  In Panel B I replace the value in Table 8, Line 1 with the 
coefficient on SLACK in Table 6, Model 3, and assume a five-decile shift in SLACK.  
That is, Panel B estimates the tax cost of a firm whose debt covenant SLACK is, on 
average, five deciles tighter than the baseline firm.  The remaining computations are 
carried out as in Table 8.  Results are similar to Panel A, although they are slightly larger. 
In  Panel C I use information for each firm to calculate a distribution of tax costs.  
That is, I substitute as much firm-specific information into Table 8 as possible when 
making the calculations.  First, I compute each firm’s average SLACK decile over the life 
of the loan.  I then use a group-specific coefficient (from Figure 1) as that firm’s average 
quarterly incremental tax expense (i.e. the average quarterly incremental tax expense for 
the SLACK group that the firm falls into over the life of the loan).  Instead of using the 
mean (or median) effective time to maturity in calculating the value lost due to the time 
value of money, I use each loan’s effective time to maturity.  Instead of using the mean 
(median) interest expense as in Table 8, I use each firm’s interest expense.  Finally, 
instead of using the mean (median) cost of debt as in Line 8 of Table 8, I use each firm’s 
estimated cost of debt.  This procedure produces a unique tax cost for each firm.  The 
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first row of Table 9 Panel C presents the mean (median) of this distribution.  While the 
distribution is slightly more skewed than that presented in Panel A, the magnitudes are 
quite similar at the median, but larger at the mean.  Specifically, I find that the mean 
(median) firm is willing to pay the equivalent of 22.72 (10.78) basis points to avoid debt 
covenant violation.  This translates to increasing the mean (median) loan spread by 
21.41% (6.85%).   
These estimates of a lower-bound on the cost of debt covenant violation are much 
smaller than those estimated by Beniesh and Press (1995).  They find that violation costs 
are around 3% of market value of equity.  My results suggest a much smaller cost, less 
than 1% of market value of equity.  On the other hand, Beniesh and Press (1995) examine 
a small sample of relatively severe violation cases.  I study a broad sample of firms, many 
of which have not violated debt covenants.  Thus, the results in Beniesh and Press (1995) 
could be interpreted as an upper bound on the cost of debt covenant violation, while the 
results I present are better interpreted as a lower bound on the cost of debt covenant 
violation. 
While the three methods used above to calculate the economic magnitude of the 
tax costs firms incur to avoid violation of debt covenants differ, all three methods suggest 
that firms face an economically meaningful tax cost because of the financial reporting 
pressure induced by debt covenants.  Firms appear willing to increase tax costs to avoid 
debt covenant violation.  If firms are behaving optimally, these costs are less than or 
equal to the expected costs of technical default, suggesting a lower bound on the cost of 
debt covenant violation.  Alternatively, these costs could be thought of as an additional 
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cost of borrowing that potentially offsets some portion of the tax benefits of debt from 
interest deductibility. 
5.4 Additional tests 
I develop several alternative tests.  First, in Figure 2 I plot the evolution of 
incremental tax in event time surrounding each quarter the firm had a covenant in the 
tightest SLACK group.  This figure shows that firms with debt covenants have much 
greater values of incremental tax leading up to quarters with tight debt covenants, but 
then incremental tax drops off substantially after the quarter in the tightest debt covenant 
group.  This result is driven by a large number of firms that default during the quarter 
slack is in the tightest decile.  This event time variation is consistent with the incremental 
tax being caused by debt covenants. 
Second, I restrict the sample to firms that have positive annual earnings.  I do this 
to mitigate concerns associated with calculating the rate of book-tax conformity when 
earnings are negative.  Additionally, I do this to ensure that firms with negative earnings 
are not driving the differences in discretionary accrual estimates for firms with tight debt 
covenant slack.  All results are statistically similar, and the economic magnitude of the 
results does not change substantially. 
Third, I estimate the tests using annual data instead of quarterly data.  While 
annual data is conducive to the calculation of book-tax conformity and discretionary 
accruals, the periodicity does not coincide with the frequency of loan covenant evaluation 
by lenders.  Nevertheless, I assume that the firm’s debt covenant slack for the year is the 
tightest value of slack reported during any quarter during the year and re-run the tests.  
All results are similar in terms of statistical significance and economic magnitude. 
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6.  Conclusion and Possible Future Research 
 This study tests the hypothesis that firms incur tax costs to avoid violation of debt 
covenants and estimates the magnitude of the tax costs firms are willing to incur.  Firms 
incur additional tax costs as a result of income-increasing earnings management 
undertaken to avoid covenant violation.  Results from a variety of tests suggest that the 
mean firm is willing to incur costs between  7.53% to 21.41% of the loan spread.  This 
translates to an increase in borrowing costs of between 12.92 (10.72) and 22.72 (12.81) 
basis points for the mean (median) firm.   As covenant slack tightens, estimated tax costs 
increase.  Since firms are willing to incur these additional tax costs as a result of activities 
to avoid convent violation, the tax costs can be interpreted as a lower bound on the cost 
of debt covenant violation in private credit agreements. 
 As a byproduct of the analysis, I also show that the rate of conformity between 
financial income and taxable income decreases as debt covenant pressure increases.  This 
result is consistent with findings in prior research that suggest private firms are more 
willing than public firms to take  aggressive tax positions even if the tax position results 
in lower financial income (Cloyd et al., 1996; Mills and Newberry, 2002). 
 The findings in this study provide a basis for several research extensions.  Some 
research suggests that debt covenants on loans with more lending participants will be 
more costly to renegotiate (Lee and Mullineaux, 2004).  On the other hand, other research 
(Roberts and Sufi, 2007b) finds that the frequency of loan renegotiation does not vary 
with syndicate size.  Thus, one empirical question that could be answered with an 
analysis that builds on this study is whether the expected costs of debt covenant violation 
vary with the structure of the loan. 
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 Similarly, some research suggests that firms and banks can reduce the costs of 
borrowing and lending by developing relationships over time (Boot, 2000).  However, the 
effect of relationship banking on the cost of debt covenant violation remains an 
unanswered empirical question.  The analysis in this paper could provide a platform for 
studying the influence of relationship lending on expected costs of debt covenant 
violation. 
While prior research has examined why firms take on financial covenants (e.g., 
Demerjian, 2007; Bradley and Roberts, 2004), no research has examined why some 
covenants are set tighter than others.  Using the measures of debt covenant slack 
computed in this study, one could study the characteristics of firms associated with the 
tightness of covenant slack at loan inception. 
 Finally, a substantial body of research in corporate finance examines whether 
firms have reached their “optimal” capital structure from a tax point of view (e.g., Miller 
and Modigliani, 1963; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Miller, 1977).  Several papers 
conclude that firms do not carry enough debt to take full advantage of corporate tax 
deductions on interest expense (e.g., Graham, 2000; Graham, Lang, and Shackelford, 
2004).  It is possible that underlevered firms could be prohibited by debt covenants from 
increasing leverage.  If this is in fact the case, an additional cost of debt covenants could 
be the interest expense deductions (and consequently tax savings) the firm forgoes when 
agreeing to debt covenants that restrict capital structure.  This hypothesis could be tested 
empirically with data on debt covenants used in this study. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
Sample selection 
 
The sample is selected from the Dealscan database provided by Loan Pricing Corporation 
and the Compustat database provided by Standard & Poor’s. 
 
 
 
 
  
Selection Criteria Firms Firm-qtrs Deals
Firms in Compustat with non-missing values of: 
quarterly data items 2, lag2, 14, 23, 36, lag36, 37, lag37, 
40, lag40, 42, 44, lag44, 49, lag49, 61, 108, lag108, 118 ; 
annual data items 63, 64 or 16, 50 5,082 96,499 N/A
Firms not covered in Dealscan 3,307 44,704 N/A
Firms covered in Dealscan with at least one financial 
covenant 1,775 51,795 4,038
Firms covered in Dealscan during quarters with a deal 
outstanding 1,775 35,596 4,038
Firms covered in Dealscan during quarters with a deal 
effective and a computed value of SLACK 1,186 16,651 2,096
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Table 2 
Description of loan data from Dealscan 
 
The table presents descriptive statistics for 4,038 unique deals from the Dealscan 
database.  All deals are required to have at least one financial covenant.  Deals per firm 
represents the number of deals entered into by the firm during the sample period 
(n=1,775 representing the number of firms with deals in the sample).  Stated maturity 
represents the stated maturity (in quarters) of the loan with the longest maturity in the 
deal.  Effective maturity represents the minimum of the time (in quarters) until maturity 
or the time until the first covenant violation.  Deal size is the amount of credit extended to 
the firm in the deal.  Number of covenants is the number of financial covenants contained 
in the deal. Interest rate spread is the cost of the loan above the base rate (usually LIBOR) 
in basis points (n=3,798 because some deals are missing pricing information in the 
Dealscan database). 
 
  
 
 
  
VARIABLE MEAN STDEV P25 P50 P75
Deals per firm 2.27 1.56 1.00 2.00 3.00
Stated maturity 15.94 8.86 11.33 16.00 20.00
Effective maturity 7.91 5.80 4.00 6.00 12.00
Deal size ($millions) 342.30 837.41 34.40 115.00 325.00
Deal size (% of Total Assets) 0.31 0.30 0.12 0.24 0.41
Number of covenants 2.96 1.22 2.00 3.00 4.00
Interest rate spread (basis points) 171.61 120.65 75.00 150.00 250.00
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Table 3 
Frequency of various financial covenants.   
 
 
  
Type Frequency
Percent of Deals 
with this 
Covenant
Percent of all 
Covenants
Debt to EBITDA 1,812 44.87% 17.00%
Fixed Charge Coverage 1,471 36.43 13.80
Interest Coverage 1,335 33.06 12.53
Tangible Net Worth 1,100 27.24 10.32
Net Worth 975 24.15 9.15
Leverage 809 20.03 7.59
CAPX 662 16.39 6.21
Debt to Tangible Net Worth 634 15.70 5.95
Current Ratio 631 15.63 5.92
Debt Severice Coverage 445 11.02 4.18
Senior Debt to EBITDA 283 7.01 2.66
EBITDA 232 5.75 2.18
Quick Ratio 162 4.01 1.52
Debt to Equity 55 1.36 0.52
Cash Interest Coverage 43 1.06 0.40
Senior Leverage 5 0.12 0.05
Loan to Value 3 0.07 0.03
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Table 4 
Estimation of the rate of conformity between taxable income and book income 
 
Model 1 is: , from Eq. (7).  Model 
2 is: 
, from Eq. (8).  TI is taxable income 
estimated from the financial statements as annual current tax expense grossed up by the 
top statutory tax rate less the change in the firm’s net operating loss carryforward 
balance.  PTBI is annual pre-tax book income.  DACC is discretionary accruals calculated 
by summing the firm’s four quarterly estimates of discretionary accruals using the 
residual from the model presented in Eq. (2).  The standard errors in Panel C are clustered 
by firm and time.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics of variables used in conformity regressions (covenant 
firms, N=6,057) 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Descriptive statistics of variables used in conformity regressions (non-covenant 
firms, N=14,833) 
 
 
 
  
VARIABLE MEAN STDEV P25 P50 P75
TI 0.058 0.165 0.006 0.053 0.115
PTBI 0.070 0.137 0.015 0.075 0.136
(PTBI-DACC) 0.065 0.166 0.001 0.076 0.148
DACC 0.004 0.087 -0.036 -0.003 0.032
VARIABLE MEAN STDEV P25 P50 P75
TI 0.007 0.355 -0.012 0.051 0.137
PTBI 0.010 0.272 -0.041 0.064 0.147
(PTBI-DACC) 0.009 0.299 -0.059 0.063 0.165
DACC 0.002 0.106 -0.048 -0.005 0.040
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Panel C:  Conformity regressions 
 
  
Parameter Model 1 Model 2
INTERCEPT -0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
PTBI 0.834***
(0.029)
(PTBI-DACC) 0.827***
(0.029)
DACC 0.845***
(0.042)
PTBI*COVFIRM -0.054**
(0.026)
(PTBI-DACC)*COVFIRM -0.073***
(0.025)
DACC*COVFIRM 0.017
(0.061)
Observations 20,890 20,890
Adjusted R-Square 0.411 0.396
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics of variables used in tests of the relation between incremental tax 
expense and financial reporting pressure.   
 
ITAX is calculated as  for firms without debt covenants and 
 for firms with debt covenants.  DACC is 
discretionary accruals for the quarter estimated as the residual from the regression shown 
in Eq. (2).   and  are estimated in Table 4, Model 2, and represent the rate of book-
tax conformity.  is the firm’s marginal tax rate for the year obtained from John Graham 
(Graham, 1996).  SLACK is calculated as the covenant threshold as reported in Dealscan 
less the actual value from Compustat scaled by the standard deviation of the actual value 
over the past eight quarters.  These values are then ranked into deciles for each covenant.  
The value of SLACK used is the firm’s minimum SLACK decile for each quarter.  NEG is 
an indicator equal to one if the firm’s annual earnings are negative, zero otherwise.  NOL 
is an indicator equal to one if the firm has a net operating loss carryforward balance, zero 
otherwise.  PP&E is the ratio of property plant and equipment to total assets.  INTANG is 
the ratio of intangible assets divided by total assets.  Missing values of INTANG are 
assigned a value of zero.  SIZE is the log of total assets.  FOPS is equal to one if the firm 
reports non-zero foreign pre-tax income.  MB is the market to book ratio, measured as the 
firm’s market value of equity at the fiscal quarter end divided by the firm’s total book 
equity at the fiscal quarter end.  INTEREST EXPENSE is quarterly interest expense 
divided by beginning total assets.  Some values of INTEREST EXPENSE are coded as 
combined or insignificant in the Compustat database.  Thus for INTEREST EXPENSE 
only, N=14,996 in Panel A and 35,673 in Panel B. TOTAL DEBT is long term debt plus 
long term debt in current liabilities all divided by beginning total assets.   
 
Panel A:  Firm-quarters with financial covenants in the Dealscan database and a loan 
active during the fiscal quarter (N=16,531) 
 
 
 
 
  
VARIABLE MEAN STDEV P25 P50 P75
ITAX 0.0003 0.0120 -0.0029 -0.0000 0.0026
SLACK 3.9084 2.8259 1.0000 4.0000 6.0000
NEG 0.1512 0.3583 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
NOL 0.3305 0.4704 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
PP&E 0.3514 0.2485 0.1577 0.2778 0.4916
INTANG 0.0644 0.1402 0.0000 0.0000 0.0382
FOPS 0.4499 0.4975 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
SIZE 6.4864 1.6493 5.3172 6.5033 7.6066
MB 2.6229 2.6485 1.2678 1.9658 3.0116
INTEREST EXPENSE 0.0052 0.0038 0.0025 0.0046 0.0070
TOTAL DEBT 0.2739 0.1938 0.1425 0.2590 0.3796
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel B:  Firms without financial covenants in the Dealscan database (N=44,212). 
 
 
  
VARIABLE MEAN STDEV P25 P50 P75
ITAX -0.0002 0.0179 -0.0033 0.0000 0.0026
SLACK N/A
NEG 0.3493 0.4768 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
NOL 0.3962 0.4891 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
PP&E 0.2761 0.2279 0.0962 0.2138 0.3880
INTANG 0.0230 0.0892 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
FOPS 0.2515 0.4339 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
SIZE 4.3928 2.0893 2.9167 4.1810 5.6559
MB 3.3411 4.2152 1.1387 2.0043 3.7057
INTEREST EXPENSE 0.0046 0.0051 0.0004 0.0031 0.0067
TOTAL DEBT 0.1886 0.3133 0.0035 0.1311 0.3054
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Table 6 
Test of incremental tax expense and financial reporting pressure from debt covenants. 
 
All coefficients (and standard errors) have been multiplied by 100 to facilitate 
presentation.  COVFIRM is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm had at least one 
financial covenant outstanding during the fiscal quarter.  All other variables are defined 
in Table 5. Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 are nested within: 
.  Model 4 substitutes 
COVFIRM for SLACK.  Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates and are clustered by firm and time (Petersen, 2007). ***, **, and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
 
  
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
INTERCEPT 0.108*** 0.303*** -0.194* -0.447***
(0.034) (0.079) (0.100) (0.023)
SLACK -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.017***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
COVFIRM 0.062***
(0.018)
NEG -0.051 -0.066 0.021
(0.041) (0.041) (0.022)
NOL -0.021 -0.019 -0.006
(0.033) (0.034) (0.016)
PP&E -0.024 0.026 0.035
(0.068) (0.093) (0.041)
INTANG 0.057 0.274** 0.143*
(0.147) (0.125) (0.081)
FOPS -0.015 -0.012 4.731***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.260)
SIZE -0.030*** -0.035*** -0.014
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
MB 0.007 0.008 -0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
INDUSTRY NO NO YES YES
TIME NO NO YES YES
NOBS 16,531 16,531 16,531 75,973
Adj RSQ 0.002 0.004 0.029 0.051
Prediction
( - )
( + )
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Table 7 
Piecewise non-linear test of incremental tax expense and financial reporting pressure 
from debt covenants. 
 
All coefficients (and standard errors) have been multiplied by 100 to facilitate 
presentation.  TIGHTSLACK is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s computed 
value of SLACK for the fiscal quarter was less than 2 (in the tightest three groups of 
covenants), and zero otherwise.  MIDSLACK is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm’s computed value of SLACK for the fiscal quarter was greater than or equal to 3, but 
less than or equal to 6, and zero otherwise.   Firms in the loosest three groups of SLACK 
(with values from 7 to 9) are captured by the intercept.  All other variables are defined in 
Table 5. Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 are nested within: 
.  Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates and are clustered by firm and time (Petersen, 2007). ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
   
Parameter Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
INTERCEPT -0.018 0.199*** -0.283***
(0.046) (0.075) (0.100)
TIGHTSLACK ( + ) 0.116*** 0.101*** 0.083**
(0.038) (0.035) (0.032)
MIDSLACK ( + ) 0.011 0.003 -0.013
(0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
NEG -0.050 -0.068*
(0.041) (0.041)
NOL -0.019 -0.018
(0.033) (0.033)
PP&E -0.017 0.032
(0.067) (0.092)
INTANG 0.061 0.284**
(0.146) (0.125)
FOPS -0.014 -0.010
(0.026) (0.025)
SIZE -0.031*** -0.036***
(0.008) (0.008)
MB 0.007 0.008
(0.006) (0.006)
INDUSTRY NO NO YES
TIME NO NO YES
NOBS 16,531 16,531 16,531
Adj RSQ 0.002 0.004 0.029
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Table 8 
Calculation of a lower bound on the cost of private debt covenant violation 
 
The table uses data presented earlier in the analysis to calculate the cost of the 
incremental tax paid by firms with tight debt covenant slack (tightest three SLACK 
groups) relative to firms with loose debt covenant slack (loosest three SLACK groups).  
Because accruals management is akin to borrowing earnings from the future, any 
incremental tax paid is assumed to be acceleration of tax expense, not the creation of new 
tax expense.  I assume that by accelerating tax each quarter for t quarters, the firm is 
foregoing the opportunity to make one lump sum payment in quarter t+1.  Thus, the cost 
to the firm is in the time value of money, and can be calculated as the present value of an 
annuity of $X for t quarters less the present value of a lump sum of $X*t paid at t+1.  The 
analysis assumes a constant payment $X each period.  The time value of money factors 
are calculated assuming a 2.5% quarterly interest rate, and eight (six) quarters for the 
mean (median) firm.  All other values are gathered from sources identified in the table. 
 
 
 
  
Description Line MEAN MEDIAN
TIGHTSLACK coefficient [Table 7, Model 3] 1 0.08% 0.08%Time value of money factor calculated as $1.00 
PVA(t ,2.5%) -  $1.00*t PV(t+1,2.5%) where t  = 8 (6) at the 
mean (median). 2 0.76 0.46
Discounted tax cost over life of loan (implicitly scaled by 
lag assets) [line 1 x line 2] 3 0.06% 0.04%
Interest expense (scaled by lag assets) [from Table 5] 4 0.52% 0.46%
Time value of money factor calculated as $1.00 
PVA(t ,2.5%) where t  = 8 (6) at the mean (median). 5 7.17 5.51
Interest Expense over life of loan (implicitly scaled by lag 
assets) [line 4 x line 5] 6 3.73% 2.52%
Tax cost as percentage of interest expense [line 3 / line 6] 7 1.70% 1.52%
Cost of debt (in basis points) [from Table 5 as (interest 
expense/long term debt)*4] 8 760.63 706.11
Lower bound on cost of debt covenant violation (basis 
points) [line 7 x line 8] 9 12.92 10.72
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Table 9 
Additional computations of the cost of debt covenant violation, and comparison of the 
cost of debt covenant violation to various benchmarks 
 
Panel A:  Comparison of tax costs to various benchmarks 
 
In Panel A the cost of violation (basis point) estimates are taken from Table 8, Line 9.  
Cost as a percentage of loan spread divides the basis points calculated in Table 8 by the 
mean (median) loan spread reported in Table 2.  Tax cost per $100 of discretionary 
accruals is calculated by dividing the discounted tax cost over the life of the loan from 
line 3 in Table 8 by the present value of the mean discretionary accruals over the life of 
the loan.  The mean discretionary accruals is estimated in unreported regressions similar 
to Table 7 except the dependent variable is discretionary accruals instead of incremental 
tax expense.  
 
  
 
 
Panel B: Comparison of tax costs to various benchmarks using the coefficients in Table 
6, Model 3 to calculate tax costs instead of the coefficients in Table 7, Model 3 as in 
Panel A and Table 8 
 
Panel B is similar to Panel A, except the cost of violation (basis points) estimates are 
derived using the coefficient estimate on SLACK in Table 6, Model 3, and assuming a 5 
decile shift in SLACK.  That is, line 1 in Table 8 is replaced by .0165%*5, or .082%.  All 
other calculations are the same as in Panel A. 
 
 
 
  
MEAN MEDIAN
Cost of violation (basis points) 12.92 10.72
Cost as a percentage of loan spread 7.53% 7.14%
Tax cost per $100 of discretionary accruals $ 2.80
MEAN MEDIAN
Cost of violation (basis points) 15.45 12.81
Cost as a percentage of loan spread 9.00% 8.54%
Tax cost per $100 of discretionary accruals $ 3.35
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel C:  Comparison of tax costs to various benchmarks, using firm specific data to 
calculate the cost of debt covenant violation and the various benchmarks 
 
In Panel C, I substitute as much firm-specific information into Table 8 as possible when 
making the calculations.  First, I compute each firm’s average SLACK group over the life 
of the loan.  I then use a decile specific coefficient from the model 
 as that firm’s 
average quarterly incremental tax expense (i.e., I use the average quarterly incremental 
tax expense for the average SLACK group that the firm falls into over the life of the loan).  
Instead of using the pooled mean (or median) effective time to maturity in calculating the 
value lost due to the time value of money, I use each deal’s effective time to maturity.  
Instead of using the pooled mean (median) interest expense as in Table 8, I use each 
firm’s interest expense.  Finally, instead of using the pooled mean (median) cost of debt 
as in Line 8 of Table 8, I use each firm’s estimated cost of debt.  This procedure produces 
a unique tax cost for each firm.  The first row of the panel presents the mean (median) of 
this distribution.  In the second row, each firm’s unique cost of violation is compared to 
its unique spread.  The panel reports the mean (median) of the resulting distribution.  The 
last row of the panel is calculated as in Panel A above, except the discretionary accrual 
model is analogous to the incremental tax model presented in Fig. 1. 
 
   
MEAN MEDIAN
Cost of violation (basis points) 22.72 10.78
Relative to Spread 21.41% 6.85%
Tax cost per $100 of discretionary accruals $ 2.02 $ 1.52
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Figure 1 
Relation between estimated debt covenant slack (SLACK) and incremental tax expense. 
 
The figure plots the coefficients  from the following model:  
. 
SLACKDECILE is the decile of SLACK, where SLACK is as defined in Table 5.  All other 
variables are defined in Table 5.  White markers in the figure indicate the point is 
statistically different from zero at the 5% level (standard errors are clustered by firm and 
time).  The thin line is fitted to highlight the downward trend.  The trend was tested 
statistically in Table 6, Models 1-3, and has a statistically significant negative slope. 
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Figure 2 
Evolution of incremental tax relative to quarter with the tightest decile of debt covenant 
slack 
 
In the figure, each quarter where SLACK (as defined in Table 5) is in the tightest group is 
considered an “event” and firm-quarters are aligned in event time.  The window begins 
four quarters before the event and ends four quarters after. 
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